The Russian economy of the late 20th century was filled with all kinds of economic reforms. During this period, many transformations and innovations occurred. After the currency transformation, economic reform took place in two stages.

Stages of transformation

The first stage included all property immovable by state structures and agriculture. The second stage involved market reform, which was supposed to increase the growth of the state's economy and the standard of living of the population. Many experts stated that these two stages would pass quickly and painlessly for the people. They also claimed that within a year, the first improvements would be visible.

As it turned out, these changes took quite a long period of time, and no improvements were visible for several more years. It must be taken into account that this reform came at a time of difficult political and financial conditions in the country.

Distribution of land

The main stage of the reform agriculture and state-owned enterprises were completely privatized. Thus, the state sold all property, and by the end of 1995 it sold more than 90% of the land into private ownership. According to the very idea of ​​land reform, private individuals had to use land and pay state taxes. This would have a positive effect on the state budget. All these ideas were taken from foreign countries, where a market economy was developed, with banking and credit foreign exchange mechanisms for replenishing state budgets.

Liberalization of the entire country

The program of radical reforms was outlined by B. Yeltsin, but its authors were the leading liberal ministers of the post-Soviet Russian government: A. Shokhin and A. Chubais. At its core, this program meant a rapid transition to a market economy. The main theorist of Russian “shock therapy” and Deputy Prime Minister of the government for economic issues there was E. Gaidar

The launch of such reforms led to skyrocketing prices and hyperinflation of the currency. Food prices increased by 300%, and only a few years later they set a course for reduction. This situation led to actual confiscation cash population and the sale of state real estate at very low prices. There have been cases when large plots were sold at a price reduced by almost a thousand times. At the beginning of 2000, economic experts assessed all budget revenues - over the entire period of privatization, the state received almost $9 billion. During this period, according to the same scheme, privatization also took place in Bolivia, but cash receipts to the budget there exceeded the amount of 92 billion dollars. Assessing the full scale of the reform in Russia, we can conclude that the stages of reform were not fully thought out and the state and the population were not ready for such changes.

According to official data, for the entire period of state reform, the biggest blow fell on commodity production, which fell by 50% and could no longer compete in the world market. The decrease in production reduced contributions to the state budget, which affected the country's population, especially workers at enterprises who could not receive wages for more than a year.

Behind the entire planet

In general, all enterprises suffered during this difficult period. The population decreased by several hundred thousand every year. Imports flourished on the market, since the state could not fully ensure its own trade turnover. At this time, economic development some African countries significantly exceeded the Russian economy.

Although the new reforms led to positive developments, due to the great destruction of the economy, the population could not fully evaluate them positively. In particular, the foundations were laid for:

• Development of various service sectors
• Increased imports, which accounted for 65% of the total market, and exports
• Computerization
• Developing a more powerful market economy
• Creating conditions for entrepreneurial activity

Economists note that it was not possible to fully solve the problems set during economic reforms. They name both objective and subjective reasons.

The starting conditions for reforms turned out to be extremely unfavorable. The external debt of the USSR, transferred to Russia in 1992, exceeded, according to some estimates, $100 billion. During the years of liberal reforms it has grown significantly. The “openness” of the Russian market to foreign goods and services, inexplicable from an economic point of view, helped in a short time to eliminate the commodity shortage - the main disease of the Soviet economic system, giving rise to a terrible social problem– job cuts at enterprises that have lost competition to Western goods. Only after the 1998 crisis were Russian manufacturers able to partially reverse this trend in their favor.

The separation of the Federal budget from the regional one and the severance of economic ties created the preconditions for the shutdown and liquidation of unique production capacities, the restoration of which became impossible. The main production assets remaining in service have reached their maximum wear and tear. Lack of experience in working in market conditions and often deliberately bringing enterprises to a standstill and bankruptcy also played a role in the destruction of economic potential.

The 1998 global financial crisis and unfavorable conditions in foreign markets had a significant negative impact on the country's economy. It was at this moment that the initiators of the reforms formed the erroneous idea that in the conditions of transition to a market, the role of the state in the economy was weakening. However, historical experience shows that in conditions of weakening of the state, social instability increases and the economy collapses. Only in a strong state does economic stabilization occur faster, and reforms lead to economic growth. The abandonment of elements of planning and centralized management occurred at a time when leading countries were looking for ways to improve it.

Copying Western economic models and the lack of serious study of the specifics also led to negative results. historical development own country. The imperfection of legislation created the opportunity without developing material production, receive excess profits by creating financial pyramids, etc. Production of industrial and agricultural products by the end of the 90s. amounted to only 20-25% of the 1989 level. The unemployment rate rose to 10-12 million people. The orientation of production for export led to the formation new structure domestic industry - its basis was formed by enterprises of the mining and manufacturing industries. The country has lost more than 300 billion dollars of exported capital in just 10 years. Rolling up your own industrial production led to the beginning of the processes of deindustrialization of the country.

Despite the efforts taken by the end of the 90s. measures to reform the economy and the emerging growth of industry, the basis of the Russian economy remained and remains the same almost completely dependent on the prices of oil and raw materials, which are manipulated in their interests by transnational corporations and cartels.

In 2009, Russia's GDP fell by 7.8%. This is a record. There was no such deep fall even in the default year of 1998, when Russia's GDP fell by 5.3%. Russia encountered similar rates of economic decline only in 1992–1994.
Rate of decline/growth of GDP various countries world in 2009 according to the IMF

TERMINATION OF THE SOVIET ECONOMIC MODEL IN 2000

The main myths about Putin's economic success were lies. Russia did not stand out in any way in terms of development rates among the CIS countries - this means that the economic growth of the 2000s was more likely a consequence of the post-Soviet countries getting rid of the remnants of the Soviet economy. The rate of economic growth in oil-rich Russia is one of the lowest in the CIS: if in 2000 we were in second place in the Commonwealth in terms of GDP growth, then in 2008 we fell back to eighth, and in 2009 we were among the leaders in the decline.

INCREASED OIL PRICES AT THE BEGINNING OF PUTIN'S RULE.
Having received an external gift of rare magnitude—unprecedentedly high oil prices—the Russian economy was expected to grow much faster. During Putin's reign, the average price of export oil was almost three times higher than under Yeltsin - $47 per barrel in 2000–2009. ($60–90 in 2006–2009) versus $16.7 in the 1990s.

With such an “oil rain”, the Russian economy was supposed to grow at a rate of 9–15% per year, like its neighbors - oil exporters, Kazakhstan or Azerbaijan.
And the growth of the economy itself was not Putin’s merit - he only successfully rode positive trends that had appeared even before his arrival. Economic growth in Russia began back in 1997, and after the default, in 1999, the country's GDP grew by 6.4%. Putin had nothing to do with this growth.

THE RF BUDGET SURPLUS IN THE 90'S TURNS INTO A DEFICIT UNDER PUTIN.
Putin began the 2000s with a budget surplus and ended it with a growing budget deficit, which in 2009 amounted to 5.9% of GDP. How to patch holes? Putin has already come up with an idea: an increase in the unified social tax, an increase retirement age. And Russia is again borrowing money abroad.

FALL OF THE RUBLE.
The maximum happened on September 9, 1998: 1 $ = 20 rubles 82 kopecks. On September 10, 1998 it became 15.77 kopecks.
In Putin’s Russia, as of January 22, 2016, $1 = 83 rubles 59 kopecks.

DIFFERENCE IN SALARY.
The difference between the average salary in the 10 most prosperous and 10 most disadvantaged regions of Russia by this indicator was 5 times in 1999, and about 4 times in 2008.

INTER-REGIONAL INEQUALITY.
The difference between the gross regional product per capita in the 10 richest regions of Russia (Moscow, Yamalo-Nenets and Khanty-Mansiysk autonomous region and others) and the 10 poorest regions (republics of the North Caucasus, Tyva, Altai Mountains, Ivanovo region) was 6.2 times in 1999, and 6.3 times in 2008.

COST OF HOUSING.
In 2000, purchasing an apartment of 50 square meters on the secondary market. m was equal to the average annual income of a Russian for 6 years, then in 2008 - already for 15 years. The average price in Russia for 1 sq. m of housing during the years of Putin's rule increased 9 times.

BRIBERY OF SEPARATIST REPUBLICS.
The Russian budget allocates fabulous amounts of money - from $4.5 to $6 billion a year - to regimes that have not only become de facto sovereign, but also cannot ensure security both in their territories and throughout Russia.
Akhmed Zakayev publicly stated that Ramzan Kadyrov fulfilled the dream of Dzhokhar Dudayev and Aslan Maskhadov about the independence of Chechnya and at the same time receives fabulous money from the federal budget.

CONCENTRATION OF BIG MONEY IN THE HANDS OF A NARROW NUMBER OF PEOPLE.
If in 1999–2000 there was not a single Russian on the world list of billionaires in Forbes magazine, then in 2010, according to Finance magazine, there are already 62 people in Russia with a fortune of over $1 billion. Among the leaders is the generously gifted Sibneft » Roman Abramovich (4th place with $11.2 billion) and Oleg Deripaska (5th with $10.7 billion), to whom Putin allocated huge funds during the crisis. The list of billionaires includes close friends of Putin: Timchenko, the Rotenberg brothers, Kovalchuk.

THE COMING CONTRAST AMONG THE BUDGET DISTRIBUTION TO THE CENTER AND REGIONS OF RUSSIA.
In 2000 distribution budget revenues between the center and the regions was 50/50, today it is 65/35.

ROADS.
In the 90s, an average of 6.1 thousand kilometers of new roads were introduced in Russia per year, but under Putin - starting in 2003 - no more than 2-3 thousand kilometers per year.
Annual commissioning of highways in Russia, thousand km

TOBACCO CONSUMPTION.
During 2000-2010, sales of cigarettes to the population increased by an average of 25%, both in absolute terms (about 430 billion pieces per year versus 355 billion pieces in 2000) and in relative terms (more than 3 thousand pieces per capita per year versus 2 thousand). ,4 thousand in 2000). This is radically worse than the situation in the 1990s, when the level of cigarette sales was 2 times lower. In the 1990s, when the average level of cigarette sales was 1,500 units per capita per year (a total of more than 200 billion units).
Smoking is the cause of 27% of deaths from cardiovascular diseases among the male population of Russia, 90% of deaths from lung cancer, 75% from respiratory diseases, 25% from heart diseases. Approximately 25% of smokers die prematurely: on average, smoking shortens life expectancy by 10–15 years.

ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION.
In 1999, the level of alcohol consumption in Russia, according to official data from Rosstat, was 8 liters per person, and real per capita alcohol consumption was 14.5 liters per person. This means that, according to both official and unofficial data, alcohol consumption during the Putin years in Russia increased by approximately 25%.
In Russia there are 18 liters per capita per year! At the same time, official data from Rosstat gives only 9.8 liters - which means the rest is unaccounted consumption of surrogate alcohol, which is especially dangerous to health!
The World Health Organization considers alcohol consumption levels above 8 liters per person per year as critical, followed by a sharp increase in mortality.
In 2008, mortality from causes related to alcohol consumption (according to Rosstat) amounted to 76,268 people...
According to experts, alcohol causes the premature death of up to 700 thousand people every year.
Every third person in Russia dies due to alcohol.

DRUG USE.
In September 2009, the UN Drug Control Council published the report “Afghan Opium Survey”, which provides frightening figures: Russia annually consumes 75-80 tons of Afghan heroin, the number of drug addicts in Russia 1999-2009. increased 10 times, and 30 thousand people die from drugs a year - this is more than the losses of the Soviet army during 10 years of the Afghan war. For comparison, throughout Europe, 5–8 thousand people die annually from hard drugs.
There are from 2 to 2.5 million drug addicts in Russia, mostly between the ages of 18 and 39. The average age of a dying drug addict is 28 years. Every year the army of Russian drug addicts is replenished with 80 thousand “recruits”.
In terms of the number of drug addicts, Russia is ahead of the European Union states by an average of 5–8 times. And in terms of consumption of hard drugs (heroin) it occupies one of the first places in the world.

Before 2010, about 1 million 600 thousand babies were born in Russia per year, while about 2 million 100 thousand citizens died!
The increase in mortality in Russia began under Brezhnev, in the 1970s, and continued until the mid-1990s. Since 1995, however, mortality in Russia has declined and in 1998 dropped to below 2 million people per year.
Under Putin, the upward trend in mortality gained new strength, reaching a new peak of 2.37 million in 2003.

RF ARMY.
Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)
In 1992-1999, 92 ICBMs (92 combat units) were supplied to the troops. In 2000-2006, only 27 ICBMs (27 combat units) were delivered to the Armed Forces, while 294 ICBMs (1,779 combat units) were written off.
Military aircraft.
in the 1990s, up to 100 aircraft were delivered to the Russian army. Since 2000, only 3 new aircraft have been delivered to the army (one Tu-160 and two SU-34).
Tanks.
In the 1990s, 120 T-90 tanks were delivered to the Russian army; after 2000, slightly more than 60 T-90s were purchased.
Ships.
In the 1990s, the Navy and maritime units of the border troops received more than 50 surface and submarine ships and boats, in the 2000s - less than ten (Institute of National Strategy. Report “Results with Vladimir Putin: crisis and decomposition Russian army”, November 2007; A. Khramchikhin, head of the analytical department of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis, “New Prime Minister - old problems,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 21, 2007)
Nuclear charges.
In the 1990s, Russia lost only 505 charges and acquired an additional 60 carriers - in the 1990s, 60 Tu-95 and Tu-160 strategic bombers were delivered to the army. 2000-2007 Russia's strategic nuclear forces lost 405 carriers and 2,498 charges. (Institute of National Strategy. Report “Results with Vladimir Putin: the crisis and decomposition of the Russian army”, November 2007; A. Khramchikhin, head of the analytical department of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis, “New Prime Minister - old problems”, “Nezavisimaya Gazeta”, September 21, 2007)
During Putin's reign, only 27 missiles were produced - more than 3 times less than in the 1990s.

D0H0DY 0T EXP0RTA 0GUN.
In the 1990s, Russia exported weapons on average for just over $1 billion per year; in 2007, revenues from arms exports amounted to $7 billion.

Cyclical crises predominate in the West. What we are experiencing, apparently, is an irregular crisis (there are no signs of cyclicality; there have been no similar phenomena in many recent decades).

The main unusual thing about the crisis in Russia is that in an industrialized country there is not an overproduction of goods and services, but a huge shortage of them. What explains this?

The first reason is that in the USSR the state completely monopolized the economy and based it on a constant shortage of means of production for civilian sectors of the economy and consumer goods.

Another cause of the crisis was the deep deformation of the structure of the national economy. We know that such deformation is a consequence of the predominant growth of divisions I and III, the weak development of division II and the service sector.

The focus on predominantly extensive development of the national economy played a negative role. The prerequisites for the crisis of underproduction arose back in the 70s, when the extensive path of expanded reproduction began to exhaust its capabilities, which affected the slowdown in the rate of increase in national income. If the average annual growth rate of national income in our country in 1966-1970. amounted to 7.8%, then in 1971-1975. - 5.7, in 1976-1980. - 4.3, in 1981-1985. - 3.2 and in 1986-1990. - 1.3 percent.

The drop in production in the fuel and raw materials industries was especially significant. Here and in a number of other sectors of the mining and processing industry, the limitation of natural resources, the increasing difficulties of their extraction, as well as the severe environmental consequences of the irrational use of natural resources have affected. As a result, the decrease in the level of extraction and processing of initial means of production in the first division affected economic growth as a whole.

The crisis of underproduction is largely due to the stagnant state of agriculture, the products of which serve as the initial basis for more than 2/3 of the current consumption fund in the national income. During the 70-80s, the production of grain, raw cotton, sugar beets, potatoes and vegetables was approximately at the level of simple reproduction. According to experts, the population's unsatisfied demand for food has reached 1/3 of its production volume.

The third reason for the crisis of underproduction was the deeply erroneous economic policy that was carried out in the 2nd half. 80s and early 90s

This policy was aimed at strengthening material incentives for workers and expanding social benefits to the population. It was completely contrary to the real state of the economy, since the production of goods for the population was rapidly falling. In 1986-1990 the growth of the money supply in society was 6 times faster than the increase in GNP. This led to a serious violation of the law of monetary circulation. A kind of “scissors” began to move, the blades of which - production and consumer demand - were increasingly moving away from each other. Only in 1990, when the volume of national income decreased by 4%, the cash income of citizens, on the contrary, increased by 17%. As a result, there was an aggravation of the crisis of underproduction, which was intertwined with a deep structural crisis. (borya 348-350)

N. Shmelev in his article “Crisis within a crisis” writes that he is convinced that the causes of our troubles do not lie in the economy. “They lie primarily in morality, psychology, general view on the lives of our political and business elite." Answering the question of what actually brought today's Russia to the brink of disaster, he writes that it all started with the completely unjustified and completely unnecessary confiscation of savings in 1992, which once and for all undermined the confidence of both the population and enterprises in the newly emerged to the Russian state and the government of reformers. Of course, everyone remembers about the “money overhang” that completely destroyed the Russian consumer market by the end of 1991. Under no circumstances should such a “shock” be allowed to occur, which instantly turned the majority of the Russian population from supporters to opponents of reforms, as the parliamentary elections of 1993 and 1995 clearly proved.

But this turned out to be not enough. All subsequent actions of the government of reformers only deepened the gap between the people and the new government.

• - “voucher scam” and actually free distribution during the privatization of a huge state property between “their own” - the nomenklatura and a few lucky upstarts.
• - The regime of “export quotas”, which allowed our “quickly rich” people, using the colossal difference between domestic and world prices, to instantly turn into dollar millionaires and, moreover, to leave the bulk of their “production” abroad;
• - Customs benefits for various kinds of “veteran”, “sports” and “church” organizations, especially for alcohol, tobacco, many types of food, cars;
• - “rolling” huge and virtually free budget money through authorized banks, supplemented subsequently by the sale of short-term government bonds to them at an interest rate unprecedented in the world.
• - The most black, unpunished crime such as financial pyramids, underground production and smuggling of alcohol, theft and sale of military property, corruption, racketeering, drug trafficking, etc.

At the same time, contrary to all theoretical and practical reasons, a policy of excessive narrowing of the money supply was pursued, creating an artificial monetary “hunger”, which deprived the vast majority of enterprises of all means of subsistence, both current and investment. In any healthy economy, the amount of money in circulation is now about 70-100% of GDP, in Russia it is only 12-15%. As a result, having completed a full circle after 1991, we have actually returned to the state of a cashless, natural economy that is so familiar to us: only about 30% of the economic circulation today is serviced by normal money, 70% is barter and various kinds of money surrogates. Hence the general non-payments: the budget has not paid enterprises for years for completed government orders, and has not paid pensions or salaries to public sector employees. Enterprises do not pay taxes to the budget, to each other, to banks, to their employees, and do not make contributions to Pension fund etc. A “vicious circle” has formed, and its culprit is the budget, because, as is known, a ruble not paid on time from the state treasury generates up to 6 rubles of non-payments throughout the entire chain of economic relations.

Non-payment of the state on its obligations throughout the world is considered either bankruptcy or a crime, in our country - “anti-inflationary policy”.

But this is not enough. In their “anti-inflationary” zeal, our government and the Central Bank decided to use the principle of a financial “pyramid” instead of a regulated issue, ensuring a fantastic level of profit for the Central Bank, Sberbank and other participants in this speculative market on issues of various kinds of short-term government securities (loans) - from 50 sometimes to 200 percent or more per annum. The result is that all free money left the real economy for the GKO market, because who will work from the normal 5-10% of annual profits.

At the same time, the short-sighted, primitive fiscal tax policy of the government of reformers very soon proved its inconsistency. She not only completed the collapse of a huge part of the real Russian economy, but pushed more than 40% of it into the shadow, i.e. completely non-tax sphere.

Russia is a unique country: the population today has, according to various estimates, about 40-60 billion dollars stuffed into their pockets and under their mattresses, and they have invested at most 2-3 billion dollars in foreign currency deposits into the organized banking system. There is only one reason: complete , absolute distrust of people both in the state and in banks, although some of them are recent years paid exceptionally high interest rates on private deposits.

There is one more serious, essentially tragic problem- the continuing flight of domestic capital from the country. According to various estimates, about 300-400 billion dollars emigrated from Russia in the 90s, which is more than 1.5-2 times higher than our debt to the outside world, and taking into account many foreign debts still unpaid - in 3 times. It is not the world that finances our country today, but a weakened Russia in deep crisis that continues to finance the world. Who is to blame for this chronic bleeding is a long conversation, but, in any case, it is not the USA, not Germany, not the IMF, and not even J. Soros. We ourselves are to blame, and first of all the government of reformers is to blame for failing (and perhaps not wanting) to put a real barrier to such leakage through both illegal and official channels.

Another grave strategic mistake is the introduction of the dollar into the country and the establishment from the very beginning of an unrealistic, unjustifiably high exchange rate of the ruble against it. Of course, every economy needs some kind of stable “anchor”. But instead of using our own experience of the 20s for these purposes and issuing a parallel, stable and fully convertible national currency with a fixed exchange rate (“chervonets”), we invited someone else’s currency, not under our control, to take on this role, turning Thus, the dollar is the true master of the Russian economy.

At the same time, China, India and most other countries that are making a massive breakthrough into world markets today have been deliberately keeping the exchange rate of their national currency 4-5 times lower than its actual purchasing power for many years, just to help their exporters.

Undoubtedly, in all the sad events there was also a certain element of bad luck: firstly, the general instability of the financial markets of developing countries, which gave rise to general panic among foreign portfolio investors, and secondly, a large drop in world oil prices, which at once reduced Russia’s total export revenues by approximately by 10-15%. And yet, to explain today's plight by this would be an unforgivable simplification.

Ladygina Anastasia Olegovna

Faculty of Economics Southern Federal University Rostov-on-Don, Russian Federation

Abstract: From the mid-80s to the 90s, new shadow norms and shadow organizations accumulated in Russia, and conditions were created for shadow economic activity. In the second half of the nineties, the shadow economy was institutionalized. The article discusses the reasons for the occurrence of this phenomenon in the period under review.

Key words: shadow economy, transition period, institution, state

Transformation of the shadow economy in Russia in the 90’s

Ladygina Anastasia Olegovna

the Faculty of Economics, Southern Federal University, Rostov-on-Don, Russian Federation

Abstract: Since the mid 80’s to the 90’s in Russia the accumulation of new shadow norms and shadow organizations, the conditions for informal economic activities have been created. In the second half of the nineties institutionalization of the shadow economy occurred. The author demonstrates causes of this phenomenon in the reporting period.

Keywords: shadow economy, transitional period, institution, polity

A review of the shadow economy in the planned economy shows that the prerequisites for its dawn had developed by the early seventies. It included people engaged in economic activities using state property. They had a special relationship with criminals, outlined within a certain framework at the turn of the sixties. The state trading system was thoroughly penetrated by the shadow economy system. This was the initial stage of the emergence and spread of this phenomenon, in which there were no institutions of shadow economic activity.

Time passed. There was an accumulation of new shadow norms and shadow organizations in the country; best conditions for shadow activities. In the 90s, the fundamental value orientations of the population were significantly deformed, the shadow lifestyle became a common occurrence for a significant part of it, and the authority of state power in the eyes of society fell. A considerable number of people have taken the criminal path.

By the mid-90s of the last century, the scale of the phenomenon under consideration reached 41.6% of the country's gross domestic product. Compared to other post-socialist countries, this figure is small. But at the same time, it should be mentioned that by this period the share of the shadow economy in some countries had noticeably decreased, which cannot be said about our country.

The data in Table 1 shows an assessment of the dynamics of the size of the shadow economy in countries with transition economies in 1989, 1992 and 1995. From them, in turn, it is clear that by the mid-nineties the share of the shadow economy in Russia was the same as in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union has increased.

Table 1 - The scale of the shadow economy in post-socialist countries according to the methodology of D. Kaufman - A. Kaliberda, as a percentage of GDP

The fact that in the second half of the nineties shadow activity began to turn into a special social institution is evidenced by data showing the share of the shadow economy in GDP production, which in 1996 reached 46%, and in 1997 and 1998, according to various estimates, the volume of shadow economy accounted for 50 to 70% of Russia's GDP.

The growth of the shadow sector in Russia during the period under review was influenced by various factors. But I would like to especially highlight the obvious miscalculations and mistakes in the implementation of economic reforms by government agencies.

Firstly, state structures at that time lost the ability not only for strategic, but also for operational management of the economy. The existing management vacuum was filled with mafia-shadow connections and relationships, the mores and customs of wild capitalism, which is characterized by enrichment through speculative operations, deception and extortion, widespread personal and clan relations, interlocking with mafia structures, and so on.

Secondly, during the implementation of the economic reform model, which included mass privatization, rapid liberalization of prices, a one-time “opening” of the economy to the outside world, restrictive monetary policy, and strict tax pressure on production, a disincentive mechanism for legal economic activity emerged that displaces it remains in the shadows to this day.

Finally, with the connivance of the state, a social structure with high shadow potential was formed in Russia. A large proportion of the population classified as poor, unemployed and fictitiously employed, the social bottom, refugees from hot spots of the former USSR, demobilized from the army and in a state of post-war shock represent a breeding ground for the shadow economy.

Both the state itself and its agencies have become active participants in shadow operations. Its representatives profited from privatization, sold natural resources, built financial pyramids, provoked financial crises.

It is also necessary to pay attention to such reasons for the rapid flourishing of the shadow economy in the 90s, such as:

a) economic:

Catastrophic destruction of the entire national economic system in connection with the liquidation of the USSR. These include: severance of cooperation ties, barter, overstocking and shortages, non-payments, as well as mass theft;

The impoverishment of the majority of the population against the backdrop of the fabulous unjust enrichment of a group of people from President Yeltsin’s entourage;

Camber financial system countries, namely: prohibitive budget deficit, hyperinflation, transition to cash payments, including foreign currency, and money surrogates, a pyramid of government borrowing, and so on;

Liquidation state system economic and financial administration and control;

Establishing an prohibitive (up to 50% of GDP) tax burden;

b) legal:

The emergence of a legal vacuum, that is, the erroneous introduction into law enforcement practice of the principle “everything that is not prohibited by law is permitted” in conditions when the old laws no longer worked and new ones did not yet exist;

Formation of a significant criminal sector in the economy;

Destruction of the law enforcement system by constant reorganizations;

Corrupt use of legislative, executive, and law enforcement agencies in the interests of the shadow economy;

Formation of legal nihilism among citizens;

c) socio-political:

Destruction of the ideological foundations of public life, that is, the entire system of state ideology was supplanted;

At this stage, the balance of power has completely emerged. All main areas of the market were clearly divided and controlled by one of the oligarchic financial and industrial groups together with the corrupt officials who patronize them. The remaining criminal “competitors” were expelled from the economic niches they occupied.

At the turn of the century, organized economic crime in Russia ceased to be criminal and through oligarchic financial and industrial groups became predominantly bureaucratic and governmental. Criminal elements gradually lost more and more of their power.

Thus, the period under review represents the stage of formation and lasting strengthening of shadow economic activity in Russia. There are many reasons for this. And they need to be known in order to understand how this phenomenon arose and how it can be ousted from the socio-economic system of our country.

References:

1. Tarasov M. Strengthening the role of the state in limiting the shadow economy in Russia // Problems of theory and practice of management: International journal. M.: 2002. No. 2
2. Burov V.Yu. Determining the scale of the shadow economy // Bulletin-Economist. 2012. No. 4
3. Latov Yu.V. The outlaw economy: essays on the theory and history of the shadow economy. M., 2001
4. Gamza V. A. Shadow economy and corruption: how to break the vicious circle? // Investigator. Federal edition. 2007. No. 11
5. Lunev V.V. Crime and shadow economy. 2005. No. 1
6. Gerasin A.N. Shadow processes in the economy of modern Russia. M., 2006